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Activity in prominent auction markets seems to be concentrated at a few sites. For
example, Sotheby’s and Christie’s have dominated the traditional fine art auction
business for a century or more, with relatively equal market shares over that period.
1 The
combined market share of the two firms is now estimated to be greater than 90%.
2  In the
online auction market, eBay refused to cut commission rates in the face of highly-touted
lower priced competition following the September 1998 opening of Yahoo! Auctions and
the March 1999 opening of Amazon Auctions. Despite eBay’s higher fees and tenfold
growth of online auctions since Yahoo’s entry,  eBay has maintained a dominant
position.
3 While eBay has (often via acquisition) achieved a large share of online auctions
in many countries, a notable exception is Japan, where Yahoo entered before eBay and is
now reported to have a 95% market share.
This paper develops a very simple model of competing auction sites to analyze
some forces that may lead auction markets to be concentrated. Specifically, we study
when two competing markets or auction sites of different sizes co-exist in equilibrium,
                                                
1 Sotheby’s is descended from the book auction firm founded by Samuel Baker in 1745 and Christie’s from
a general art, furniture, etc. business founded by James Christie in 1766. The two firms achieved
prominent positions by the early 19
th century.  See Learmount (1985). Each firm had about $2.25 billion in
gross merchandise sales in 1999.
2The U.S. Department of Justice uses the 90% figure in press releases related to the recent price-fixing case.
Bonhams (founded 1793) and Phillips (founded 1796) recently merged their UK operations to form what is
said to be the third largest traditional fine art auction house with gross merchandise sales of about $200m.
The third largest fine art auction house in the U.S., Butterfield and Butterfield, had about $100m in annual
merchandise sales prior to its acquisition by eBay. The dominant position of the two firms is particularly
striking given that they were accused of collusion following fee increases in 1975 and 1992, and were
convicted of price-fixing in connection with their joint adoption in 1995 of a nonnegotiable scale for
sellers’ commissions.
3 About $8 billion in merchandise will be auctioned on eBay this year. This is perhaps twenty times the
volume of trade on Yahoo or Amazon. The second largest “auction” site for consumer products is actually
Ubid.com which sells computers, electronics and a variety of other goods (often refurbished and/or surplus
merchandise) directly to consumers and mostly uses “no reserve” auctions rather than posted prices. It also
lists items for sale by other firms.and when this is impossible because the larger auction will attract all of the smaller one’s
patrons.  It is clear that two markets can co-exist if they are geographically distinct and
clients face sufficiently large transport costs, and conversely it is clear that otherwise
identical markets of different sizes cannot co-exist if larger markets offer a greater variety
of goods and buyers have a sufficiently large preference for more diverse markets.  This
paper abstracts away from both of these issues by examining an extremely stark model
with a single good that is traded in a single period.
In our model, there are B ex-ante identical buyers, each with unit demand, and S
sellers, each with a single unit of the good to sell. At the start of the period a population
of B buyers and S sellers simultaneously choose between two possible locations. Buyers
then learn their private values and a uniform price auction is held at each location.  This
is a very stark model, but we hope that some of the insights it provides will be useful,
and that it can provide a benchmark case for richer and more realistic models.
Our model always has an equilibrium in which only a single market is active:
With such extreme coordination a player who switched to the other market would find
that there is no one to trade with.  When the numbers of buyers and sellers are even,
there is also an equilibrium where the two markets are exactly the same size.  An
important question is whether the equal-size market is an unstable  “knife-edge” case, or
whether in fact there is a range of equilibrium allocations of agents to markets.
To begin, we show in Section 2 that larger markets are more efficient than smaller
ones, holding the seller/buyer ratio constant.  This efficiency effect makes it harder for
the smaller market to survive, but on its own it does not rule out equilibria with two
active markets, because the efficiency advantage (on a per-trader basis) of a larger marketis on the order of the inverse of the number of traders. Hence, it can be offset the impact
that any individual trader has on the market price when he or she switches to the other
market, which tends to be of the same magnitude.  Because of this  "crowding" or
“market impact” effect,   the equal-sizes configuration mentioned above is not only an
equilibrium, but a strict equilibrium: If a buyer or seller were to switch to the other
market he or she would find that there were now more participants on his or her side of
the market and no more on the other, which would make it strictly less attractive.
Our goal in this paper is to determine the range of equilibrium market sizes that is
permitted by these two conflicting effects.  Proposition 3 presents a general but
correspondingly weak first result on this question: It is impossible for a market with a
finite number of buyers and sellers to coexist with market with a continuum of
participants.  Intuitively, there is no crowding from moving into an infinite market, so
equilibrium requires that both the buyers and the sellers do as well in the small market as
in the large one, but this is inconsistent with the fact that the deterministic outcome in the
infinite market gives each buyer the highest possible expected surplus for a given
expected utility of the sellers.
Section 3 contains some simple general results.  The results here serve two
purposes: they provide intuition for why the equilibrium set has the form it does, and they
are used as lemmas in later sections.  This section simplifies the analysis in two ways.
First, the section looks at “quasi-equilibria,” which drop the constraint that the numbers
of buyers and sellers in each market must be integers.  Second, instead of deriving the
utility functions for the buyers and sellers in each market from the auction game, section
3 treats the utility functions as exogenous primitives, and simply imposes a set ofconditions on them. (The conditions are satisfied for the two distributions that we have
analyzed, the uniform and exponential.)  Notably, we strengthen the conclusion of
Proposition 3 by assuming that either buyers or sellers are worse off in a finite market
than in a small market than in a larger one, even if the larger market is not infinite. Also,
we assume that the amount that either buyers or sellers prefer the larger market is
bounded by a term proportional to the square of the difference in sizes, divided by the
total number of buyers.  It is intuitive that this difference should go to zero as the
difference in sizes shrinks; the quadratic bound is sufficient for a range of equilibrium
sizes to persist as the total number of participants grows.
Sections 4 and 5 specialize the model to two particular distributions. In section 4
we assume that buyers’ valuations are uniformly distributed on [0, 1]; this might be a
reasonable assumption for thinking about Pokemon cards, Beanie Babies, and other
ordinary items being sold on eBay. We verify that the induced market utilities satisfy the
assumptions of Section 3, and use those results to get an exact characterization of the set
of quasi-equilibria. It is typically possible to have a stable two-site equilibrium where the
small site is one-third or one-fourth as large as the larger site; just how unequal the two
markets can be depends on the buyer-seller ratio, for reasons explained in section 4. We
note that this qualitative conclusion is robust in a couple ways: it would suffice for agents
on one side of the market rather than both to recognize that they have a market impact;
and similar results still obtain if we restrict attention to full equilibria with integer
numbers of agents in each market.
Section 5 examines the model with exponentially distributed valuations. This
might be a reasonable assumption for thinking about fine art items. We note somedifferences in how the model works out, but the general pattern of the results is the same.
There are equilibria with somewhat unequal market sizes, and there again is a cutoff such
that a market with less than that fraction of all agents can not be viable. Our take on the
results is that the efficiency effect can lead agents to concentrate, but does not seem
sufficiently powerful to account for all of the concentration we observe.
Section 6 examines another factor that may support concentration – market
“thinness”. One aspect of eBay listings that we found striking when we looked at a
random sample of items is that most of them seemed to be unique items. This may be an
important common trait of fine art and online auctions. One way to model the sale of
unique items would be to modify our basic model so that each seller only has a chance q
of having an object for sale. When q is sufficiently small (relative to S) it is easy to see
that this model predicts complete concentration (except for a knife-edge equilibrium with
a 50-50 split). When q is small enough sellers can essentially ignore the possibility that
they will be competing with other sellers. If one market has more buyers, then all sellers
will go to that market, and hence it must have all buyers. While this is a powerful
argument, we note that it requires a fairly extreme thinness.  If there are only three
sellers, each of whom is certain to have the good (so we return to q = 1) there is a split
equilibrium with two sellers going to one market and one seller to the other.
The fact that a size ratio of  3:1 or 4:1 is possible is consistent with the long-term
coexistence of Christie’s and Sotheby’s; it is also consistent with the lack of successful
large-scale entry into this market.  In contrast, eBay is too much larger than its
competitors to be consistent with the bounds we derive; from the viewpoint of our modelthis market looks more like one that has “tipped” to a single auction than a stable
coexistence of multiple auction sites.
  Our conclusion that a range of size ratios is possible differs from that of past
analyzes of the choice of location or market inn cases where the efficient outcome would
be for everyone to go to the same location. We discuss this in greater detail in section 7,
but let us note here two important features of our model.  First of all,  previous analyzes
have argued that that the “crowding” or “competitive” effect of  one agent moving on
equilibrium outcomes in each location is small enough to be ignored; in our model this
effect is as large as the efficiency force that pushes in the opposite direction. Second, in
some past work, such as Pagano [1989], there is a single group of agents, rather than the
distinct sets of buyers and sellers here, so that there is no “market impact effect” to
counterbalance the efficiency advantage of larger markets.
4
2. The Efficiency of Large Markets
A. Welfare in a Single Market
Consider a single market with S sellers and B S >  buyers.  The efficient outcome
here is for the buyers with the S  highest values to receive the good, so the maximum total
surplus that can be achieved is  
:: : Pr( ) ( | ) ( | )
SB SB SB B vv E v vv S E v vv ≥≥ = ≥ ii i .  The
maximized surplus per seller (or per item sold) is 
:1 : (| ) (| )
SB S B Evv v Evv v
+ ≥= > , which
we define to be  (,) wSB.  This can be written as
                                                
4 In Pagano’s model, players do not know ex-ante whether they will be buyers or sellers.() 1:
1: 1: 1:
0 (,) (| ) ( )
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bb SB SB SB
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where the fs are the relevant densities. Note that as the market grows, holding the
buyer/seller ratio fixed, the efficient outcome converges to  a deterministic limit, with the
good given to all buyers whose value exceeds the market-clearing price  
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. Thus welfare per seller converges to the average of the
buyer values on the range where value is at least the market price,  (| ) E vv v ≥ .
The following propositions show that our model has the intuitive property that
larger markets are more efficient.  The first result compares a finite market to the
continuum limit discussed above; the second extends this to a comparison of finite
markets of different sizes.
Proposition 1
The maximal expected surplus per buyer in a finite market with S sellers and B buyers is
strictly less than the maximal surplus in a market with continua of buyers and sellers and
the same seller-buyer ratio.
Remark:  The idea of the proof is simply that the distribution of realized utility as a
function of buyer’s value in the large market first-order stochastically dominates the
distribution in the small one. In both markets, buyers have the same probability 
S
B
 ofreceiving the good, but in the small market, buyers “win”  in a less efficient way, as they
sometimes win when vv < .
Proof:   Let () cv be the buyer’s probability of consuming the good in the small market
when  his value is v. Then the buyer’s expected utility in the large market is
(| )P r ( ) E vv v v v ≥⋅ ≥, and her expected utility in the small market is  (( ) ) E vcv ⋅ .  And so
the difference in utility between the large and small market is
(| )P r ( ) ( () ) E vv v v v Evcv ≥⋅ ≥− ⋅ =
( | ) Pr( ) ( ( )| ) Pr( ) ( ( )| ) Pr( ) E v v v v vE v c v v v v vE v c v v v v v ≥⋅ ≥− ⋅ ≥⋅ ≥− ⋅ <⋅ <=
() ( 1 ( ))| Pr( ) ( ( )| )Pr( ) E vc v v v v vE v c v v v v v −≥ ⋅ ≥ − ≤≤ >
() ( 1 ( ))| Pr( ) ( ( )| )Pr( ) E vc v v v v v E v c v v vv v −≥ ⋅ ≥ − ≤≤ =
() 1 ( )| Pr( ) ( ( )| )Pr( ) v E c vvv vv E c vvv vv −≥ ⋅ ≥ − ≤≤ =  
[] P r ( ) (() ) 0
SS
vv v E c vv
BB
 ≥− = − =  
;
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that the trade in the small market is not
deterministic (because S<B and the distribution of types is strictly monotone.)
QED.
The next result extends the previous one by showing that efficiency is in fact
monotone in market size.  It implies the first, but has slightly more complex proof that
views the smaller market as a subsample of  the larger one.
Proposition 2If m and n are  integers with m<n, then holding S and B fixed we have
(,) ( ,) w mS mB w nS nB < .
Proof:  See appendix.
Remark:   We conjecture that this convergence is at rate 1/n.  We can show that this is the
case for the normal approximations to the distribution of the order statistics; a complete
proof along this line would require an analysis of the rate of convergence of the
distributions of the order statistics to the approximating distributions.
B.  Equilibrium Prices in an Auction
To model price formation, we suppose there is a uniform-price sealed bid auction.
Thus if the market doesn’t have excess supply, the price will be at the (S+1)st highest of
the B buyer values, that is 
1: SB v
+ , which we will also denote as  p . We assume that
1 SB +<  so that if all agents go to a single market there is excess demand and so with
probability 1 the market price is strictly positive. Since sellers have 0 reservation value
and are risk neutral, their expected utility in this market is just the expected price, which
we denote by  p ,or  (,) p SB when we need to track the dependence on the number of
buyers and sellers.  The expected utility of a buyer in a market with S sellers and B
buyers (including himself) is
1: : (,) ( | )
SB S B
b uS B E vv v v
+ =− ≥ .






= .C.  A Finite Market Cannot Co-exist with an Infinitely Large One
We can use the fact that large markets are more efficient that small ones to get a
general impossibility result:  A market of  fixed finite size cannot coexist with a market
that is infinitely large.  Let the finite market be market 1, with numbers  11 , SB  of sellers





,   and the
deterministic price 







−= .  A buyer or seller moving
into the large market will have no effect on the price there, so for both markets to coexist
it is necessary and sufficient that the expected price in market 1  satisfies 
12 p p ≥  (or else
sellers move to market 2) and  that 
12
bb uu ≥  (or else the buyers move.)
Proposition 3
 There is no equilibrium in which trade takes place in both a continuum market and a
finite one.
Proof:     As before let  () cv be the buyer’s probability of consuming the good in the
small market when her type is v.  Then 
22 2 2 (|) P r () b uE v p v p v p =− ≥ ≥ is the buyer’s
expected utility in the large market, and  ()
11 () ( ) b uE v p c v =− i  is the buyer’s expected
utility in the small market.   Since  ()
1 () E pc v i  is the buyer’s expected payment, and





, we know that() ()
11 1 1 1
1
() (() ) ()
B
E p cv p pEcv E p cv
S
== = ii .  Hence
() ()
11 1 ( ) () ( ) () b uE v p c v E v p c v =− =− ii , and so  
12 p p ≥  implies that
() ()
11 2 () ( ) () ( ) b uE v p c v E v p c v =− ≤− ii .
The expression on the right hand side is the buyer’s expected utility when he pays
price 
2 p  and purchases according to  () cv. This expression is maximized when the buyer
purchases exactly when 
2 vp ≥ , and the maximized utility is exactly  the buyer’s utility in
the large market.  Any other specification of c leads to strictly lower utility, so 
12
bb uu <
because with a strictly monotone cdf F, equilibrium trade in the small market cannot
follow the deterministic rule “consume exactly when 
2 vp ≥ ”.
QED
3. Two Finite Markets
Proposition 3 suggests that there must be a bound on the ratio of the sizes of two
markets for both of them to remain active. In this section, we present some general results
on the coexistence of two finite markets. The results illustrate and provide some intuition
for our main observation – that markets of somewhat different sizes can coexist. We will
also use them in subsequent sections, where we assume specific distributions of buyer
valuations to study how the maximum inequality in equilibrium market size relates to the
size of the overall “economy” (that is the combined sizes of the two markets) and to the
aggregate buyer-seller ratio.Let ( , ) s uS B  and  ( , ) b uS B  be the seller and buyer utility in a market with S sellers
and B buyers. While these functions would normally be defined only on the nonnegative
integers, for the purposes of this section we will think of them as continuous functions
defined on [0, ) [0, ) ∞× ∞. Assume that these functions satisfy:
 (A1)
(,)0  i f   ,   (,) 0  i f  
(,)0  i f   0 ,   ( 0 ,)0  
ss
bb
uS B B SuS B B S
uS B S u B
>> = ≤
>> =
For B > S assume that the functions are differentiable and satisfy the natural
monotonicity properties:
(A2)  0, 0, 0, and  0





We showed in Proposition 2 that holding the buyer-seller ratio constant larger
markets are more efficient. In Proposition 3 we showed that either buyers or sellers are
worse off in a finite market than in a market with a continuum of sellers, regardless of
whether the buyer-seller ratio is different. In this section, we'll assume that in a
comparison of two finite markets, the smaller market is less efficient in a similar sense.
 (A3)  12 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 I f    t h e n   ( ,) (,)  o r   ( ,) (,) . ss bb B Bu S B u S B u S B u S B << <
This condition is satisfied in the uniform and exponential cases we consider in the next
two sections, and we conjecture that it holds under fairly general conditions.
In our analysis we will often present simpler results ignoring integer constraints.
Our basic definitions are
Definition. An allocation  1212 (, ,, ) SSBBis a quasi-equilibrium if it satisfies the following
four constraints:(S1)  11 2 2 (,) ( 1 , ) ss uSB uS B ≥+
(S2)  22 1 1 (,) ( 1 ,) ss uSB uS B ≥+
(B1)  11 22 (,) (, 1 ) bb uSB uSB ≥+
(B2)  22 11 (,) (, 1 ) bb uSB uSB ≥+
Definition. An allocation  1212 (, ,, ) SSBB is an equilibrium if it is a quasi-equilibrium and
121 ,, SSB  and  2 B  are all integers.
Checking whether an allocation is an equilibrium in principle requires checking
four constraints.  However, we will show that only the constraints ensuring that agents do
not want to leave the smaller market are relevant for determining the smallest possible
number of buyers in an active market.
To make the argument, it is helpful to define the loci where the incentive




B SB be the value of  1 S  such that such that (B1) holds with equality at
11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− . Let 
1
11 ()
S SB the value of  1 S  such that  (S1) holds with equality at
11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− .
Lemma 1: Given assumptions (A1)–(A3),
1
1
B S is a well-defined, increasing, differentiable
function on the domain [0, ] B . There exist constants 
min B and 
max B  with
min max 0/ 2 B BBB <<<< such that 
1
1
S S is a well-defined, increasing, differentiablefunction on the domain 
min max [, ] BB with 
1m i n
1 () 0
S SB = and 
1m a x
1 ()
S SB S = . Moreover,
1
11 () / 21 / 2
S SB S =+  and 
1
11 () / 2
B SB S < .
Proof: See appendix.
Proposition 4 is a precise statement of our observation that one need only consider
whether the “small market” constraints can be satisfied in order to determine whether
there is a quasi-equilibrium with specified numbers of buyers in the two markets.
Proposition 4
Fix S and B with 1 SB +< . Assume (A1) – (A3) and that 1 /2. BB ≤ Then, there exists an
1 S  such that  11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− is a quasi-equilibrium if and only if there exists an  1 S
such that  11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− satisfies the (B1) and (S1) constraints.
Proof: The "only if" direction is trivial. To establish the "if" result, suppose that  1 B  and
1 S   are such that  11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −−    satisfies the (B1) and (S1) constraints.
By analogy to the construction in the lemma, let 
2
11 ()
B SB be the (unique) value of  1 S such
that (B2) holds with equality, and let 
2
11 ()
S SB be such that  (S2) holds with equality.
Considering the payoffs as  1 S approaches 0 and S it is easy to see that the former is well
defined. For  1 B  less than 
max B B − there is no  1 S that makes (S2) hold with equality. If thisis the case, condition (S2) always holds and can be ignored (or one can regard all of the
equations below as applying with 
2
11 ()0 .
S SB = )
(B1) is satisfied if and only if 
1
11 1 () .
B SS B ≥  (S1) is satisfied if and only if
1
11 1 () .
S SSB ≤  (B2) is satisfied if and only if 
2
111 () .
B SSB ≤ (S2) is satisfied if and only if
2
11 1 () .
S SS B ≥ The fact that (B1) and (S1) are both satisfied at  1 S   implies that
11
11 11 () () .
SB SB SB ≤ Assumption (A2) immediately implies that 
12
11 11 () ()
BB SB SB < and
21
11 1 1 () ()
SS SB SB < , e.g.
11 1 1
11 1 112 11 1 112 ( () ,) ( () , 1 ) ( () , 1 ) ( () , ) .
BB B B
bb b b uS B B uS S B B uS B B uS S B B =− + ⇒ +< −
Finally, using (A2),  (A3), and then (A2) again we can see that 
22
11 11 () ()
SB SB SB < :
22 2 2
11 1 11 2 11 1 11 2
22
11 1 11 2
22
11 1 11 2
( ( ) 1 , ) (( ) , ) ( ( ) , ) (( ) , )
       ( ( ), ) ( ( ), )
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Combining these inequalities gives
21 12
11 11 11 11 max( ( ), ( )) min( ( ), ( )).
SB SB SB SB SB SB ≤
Any  1 S  between these bounds will satisfy (B1), (B2), (S1) and (S2).
QED
The following result on the possibility of very unequal or almost equal market
splits follows easily from Proposition 4.
Proposition 5Fix S and B with 1 SB +< . Assume (A1) – (A3). Then,
(a) There exist quasi-equilibria for all  1 B in some neighborhood of  /2 B .
(b) There do not exist quasi-equilibria for positive  1 B  in some neighborhood of 0.
Proof: For part (a) note that (S1) and (B1) are satisfied with strict inequalities for
1 /2 B B = and  1 /2. SS = By continuity, they are also satisfied for nearby values of  1. B
For 
min
1 B B <  (A2) implies that (S1) cannot be satisfied and hence there is no quasi-
equilibrium.  QED
Remark: Proposition 5 shows that the quasi-equilibrium with a 50-50 split is not a knife-
edge for any fixed market size.  This leaves open the possibility that the set of two-
market equilibria shrinks to a 50-50 split as the market size grows.  Proposition 7 below
provides a much stronger result on the coexistence of small and large markets.
The following result provides a little more detail on the structure of the quasi-
equilibrium set.
Proposition 6
Assume (A1)–(A3). Then there exists a  1 [0, /2] BB ∈  and an  1 [0, /2] SS ∈ for which (S1)
and (B1) both hold with equality. If there is a unique such 1 B , then there exists an  1 S  such
that  11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− is a quasi-equilibrium if and only if  11 1 [, ] . B BB B ∈−Proof:   Assume w.l.o.g.  that  1 /2. BB ≤  We noted in Lemma 1 that 
1m i n
1 () 0 .
S SB =  The
assumption in (A1) that buyers receive zero utility when there are no sellers implies that
1m i n
1 () 0
B SB > . Lemma 1 also shows that 
1
1 (/ 2 ) / 21 / 2
S SB S =+  and 
1
1 (/ 2 ) / 2 .
B SB S <  By
the intermediate value theorem there exists a  1 [0, /2] BB ∈ for which 
11
11 11 () ()
BS SB SB = .
For  11 B B =  and 
1
111 ()
B SSB = , (S1) and (B1) hold with equality.
We know from Proposition 4 that a quasi-equilibrium exists with  1 B  buyers in the
smaller market if and only if 
min
1 B B ≥ and
11
11 11 () ()
BS SB SB ≤ .  If the two curves have a
unique intersection, then the fact that they are continuous and that
11
11 (/ 2 ) (/ 2 )
BS SB SB < implies that 
11
11 11 () ()
BS SB SB ≤  if and only if  [] 11 ,/ 2 BB B ∈ .
QED
Remark: We will sometimes refer to the assumption in the second part of Proposition 6 as
the single crossing condition for the 
1
1
B S and 
1
1
S S curves. It will be straightforward to show
that it holds for the distributions of valuations considered in sections 4 and 5. A major
component of our characterizations of the quasi-equilibrium set will be explicitly solving
for  1 B .
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the structure of the equilibrium and quasi-equilibrium
sets in a typical case. (The  b u  and  s u  functions were taken to be the "natural" extensions
to the reals of the functions one would derive in an example with ten buyers with
valuations drawn from a uniform distribution on [0,1] and five sellers.)Figure 1 graphs the fractions of sellers in market 1 that make buyers and sellers
exactly indifferent between the two markets against the fraction of buyers in market 1.
The functions satisfy the assumptions (A1)-(A3). As a result, the solid 
1
1
B S  curve lies
above the dotted 
1
1
S S curve when  1 /2 B B < . (For 
1
111 ()
S SSB = sellers are indifferent
between the small and large market. (A3) implies that buyers prefer the small market for
this  1 S . (A2) then implies that buyers are indifferent only with a higher  1 S .) The unique
intersection of the curves is at  1 /2 B B = . If buyers and sellers did not adversely affect
prices when moving to the other market, the only quasi-equilibrium with split markets
would be an unstable equilibrium with an exactly 50-50 split between the two markets.
Figure 2 graphs the values of  1 / SS  for which the (B1), (B2), (S1) and (S2)
constraints hold with equality for the same utility functions as in Figure 1. The quasi-
equilibrium set is the parallelogram-shaped region in the center of the figure below the
curves where (S1) and (B2) hold with equality and above the curves where (S2) and (B1)
hold with equality. In this example, quasi-equilibria exist whenever the smaller market
has at least 11% of the buyers (meaning  1 B is at least 1.1).
We have placed small stars in the figure at points within the quasi-equilibrium set
where the numbers of buyers and sellers are both integers. These are the equilibria. In an
equilibrium the smaller market can have two buyers and one seller or four buyers and two
sellers.  There is no equilibrium with three or five buyers in the smaller market. With
three buyers in the smaller market, for example, then there are a range of values of  1 S
near one-and-a-half which satisfy the quasi-equilibrium conditions. None of these
allocations, however, satisfy the integer constraints – sellers would be unwilling to stay insmall market if there were two sellers, while buyers would be unwilling to stay in a
market if there was only one seller.
Unequal sized markets are only possible in our model because buyers and sellers
have an adverse “market impact” if they switch markets. The market impact is small
when the number of buyers and sellers is large, but so are the efficiency differences.  For
example, while there is a very big difference between having two and four buyers in a
market, a market with two hundred sellers is already close to efficient and there is little
difference between such a market and a market with four hundred sellers.
To illustrate how markedly the efficiency effect declines with the size of the
market, Figure 3 graphs the equal-buyer-utility and equal-seller-utility curves which
apply to a model with 30 buyers and 15 sellers (and a uniform distribution of seller
valuations as in Figure 1). The curves are much closer together than the curves in Figure
1. Sellers are indifferent when prices are equal in the two markets. The closeness of the
two curves reflects that efficiency differences are fairly small and can only offset a small
difference in price.
Figure 4 graphs the four curves that bound the quasi-equilibrium set in this case.
One interesting thing to note is that the range of market sizes in the quasi-equilibrium set
is very similar to that in Figure 2: Here a quasi-equilibrium exists whenever at least 12%
of the buyers are in the small market, as compared to the 11% in Figure 2. The quasi-
equilibrium set looks much flatter in the S-dimension. This reflects that the “market
impact” is much smaller and hence buyer and seller utility (the latter of which is equal to
the price) have to be more nearly equal in the two markets in equilibrium. The stars in the
figure illustrate that there are nonetheless a substantial number of true equilibria. (Recallthat the y-axis graphs  1 / SS and hence the integers are closer together.)   Recall that
Proposition 5 did not rule out the possibility that the fraction of buyers necessary to make
the small market viable in a quasi-equilibrium might be converging to one-half as the
number of buyers and sellers grows. In the examples discussed in sections 4 and 5 the
degree of asymmetry between markets that is possible in a quasi-equilibrium is roughly
independent of the total market size (for a given buyer-seller ratio).  To provide some
intuition for this, we offer a more general sufficient condition under which there is a set
of quasi-equilibria with a non-vanishing interval of market sizes even in the limit as
market size goes to infinity. 
Assume that  12 B B < . Note that conditions (B1) and (S1) can be rewritten as
(B1′)  22 22 22 11 (,) (, 1 ) (,) (,) bb bb uSB uSB uSB uSB −+ ≥ −
(S1′)  22 2 2 22 11 (,) ( 1 ,) (,) (,) . ss ss uSB uS B uSB uSB −+≥ −
The left-hand sides of each of these conditions measure the “market impact” that buyers
and sellers, respectively, have when they move to market 2. The right-hand sides measure
the degree to which buyers and sellers, respectively, find the larger market more
attractive. Assumption (A3) implies that the RHS of at least one of these two equations is
positive.
In the examples we examine in the following two sections, when the buyer-seller
ratio in each of the two markets is held fixed at γ , the market impact and large-market










There exists an x (0,1/2) and positive constants  , ,  and   such that
       ( , ) ( , 1)
       ( , ) ( 1, )
       ( , ) ( , )

























12 1 1 1 2 2 when / [ ,1/2], ,   and  .
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BB x B BB S B S B γγ ∈= − ==
Roughly, what this means is that the “market impact” of a buyer or seller is a 1/B effect
and that the “efficiency advantage” of a large market goes to zero at rate 1/B as B gets




between the sizes of the two
markets (expressed as a fraction of the total number of buyers).
It is easy to show that when the market impact and efficiency advantages of the
smaller market are of this magnitude, then the range of  1's B for which a quasi-equilibrium
exists (with equal buyer-seller ratios in the two markets) is a nonvanishing fraction of the
total market size.
Proposition 7
Suppose  s u and  b u satisfy (A1)–(A3). Suppose that for a given value of γ , (A4) is
satisfied and the inequalities in (A4) hold for constants  123 4 , , , , and  x kkk k . Then for any
B and any  1 B with 
1
13 24 13 24
11 11





∈− +  and




∈− , the model with B buyers and  B γ sellers has a quasi-equilibrium with  1 B
buyers in market 1.Proof: We know from Proposition 4 that it suffices to show that for a fixed B and S, (B1′)
and (S1′) are satisfied for some  1 S whenever  1 [, 1 / 2 ] Bx ∈  and
21 1 3 2 4 () / m i n ( / , / ) B BB k k k k −< . That (B1′) holds for  11 SB γ = follows immediately from
(A4) and  21 1 3 () // B BB k k −<
3 12 1
22 22 22 11 (,) (, 1 ) (,) (,) bb bb
k kB B
u S Bu S B u S Bu S B
B BB
−
−+ ≥ ≥ ≥ −.
That (S1′) also holds for this  1 S follows just as easily from (A4) and  21 2 4 () // B BB k k −<
22 1 4
22 2 2 22 11 (,) ( 1 ,) (,) (,) ss ss
kB B k
u S Bu S B u S Bu S B
B BB
−
−+≥ ≥ ≥ − .
QED
In the following two sections we will consider two particular specifications of the
value distribution, verify that they satisfy each of the assumptions used in this section,
and then perform some explicit calculations to provide a clearer view of the quasi-
equilibrium and equilibrium sets.
4. Two Finite Markets: The Uniform Case
 To learn more about when two markets can co-exist, and to verify that the
assumptions in Section 3 are reasonable, we will consider two tractable distributions in
some detail.  This section analyzes the uniform distribution, which has  a bounded
support, and the next section analyzes the exponential case, where the distribution of
values is unbounded.  The bounded-support case may be a better description of markets
for goods where there is a readily available close substitute that effectively caps themaximum willingness to pay, while the unbounded support may be a better description of
models for one-of-a-kind objects like paintings or rare collectibles. On  the technical side,
the distinction between bounded and unbounded support is relevant to our analysis
because with a bounded support,  the expected value of the highest value is less sensitive
to adding more buyers.
A. Preliminaries
 Under the uniform distribution, the expected value of the ith lowest  order





David [1970].) The seller’s expected utility is equal to the expectation of the price, which
we will denote by  p . The price is given by the S+1
th highest buyer value, which is
the
















. We can also compute
1: 1:










. Because the buyers valuation conditional on
being greater than p is uniform on (, 1 ] p , the buyer’s expected utility conditional on
winning the good at p is (1 ) / 2. p −  Each buyer wins the good with probability  / SB , so
the buyer’s expected utility is  () 1( , ) (1 )
(,)








.  Note that holding
S
B
 constant, buyers are actually better off in smaller markets, even though the larger
market is more efficient.Adding a seller to a market causes the price to fall by 
1
1 B+
, irrespective of the
number of sellers in the market, while adding a buyer reduces buyer utility by
(1 )





.  Thus the “crowding” or “market impact” effect of adding another buyer
is strongest when 
S
B
 is near to 1; this will allow more unequal size ratios to be equilibria.
Although the derivation of the utility functions assumes that the numbers of uyers and
sellers are integers, the utility functions given above are well-defined for all non-negative
real numbers.  Moreover, it is clear from inspection that these functions satisfy (A1) and
(A2).    For (A3) (at least one side is better off in a larger market) note that we can rewrite









=− + ; 
5 thus if prices are higher in market 1 and
1 B is smaller than  2 B , then buyers must be better off is market 2.  (A4) requires that there
be lower bounds on the market impact and upper bounds on the efficiency advantage of
larger markets of a particular form when  1 / B B is in some interval [, 1 ] x x − .
The market impact effect of adding a seller is at least 1/B , while the market impact of




.  As we remarked above, holding 
S
B
 fixed, buyers are
worse off in larger markets, so we can take  3 0 k = . Finally, we compute
1 2 1 2 2 1 21 21
22 11
12 12
() ( 1 )
(,) (,) .
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ss
SB S B SB S B B B
uSB uSB
BB BB
γ ++− −− − −
−= =
++ ++
If we restrict 
1 B
B
to lie in the interval [, 1 ] x x − , this is less than
21
2




γ −−B. Necessary And Sufficient Conditions for Quasi-Equilibrium
Proposition 8
 When buyer values have the uniform distribution, there is an unique   1 [0, /2] BB ∈  for













B B →∞ →∞ =− .
Corollary
 There exists an  1 S  such that  11 1 1 (, ,, ) SS SBB B −− is a quasi-equilibrium if and only if
11 1 [, ] . B BB B ∈−  There are no equilibria in which both markets are active and





++  ≤− = − 

.
Proof of Proposition 8: Set  21 SS S =− and  21 B BB =−.  The (S1) constraint can be










When (S1) holds with equality, the (B1) constraint, which is
11 22
11 2 2
(1 ) (1 )









() ( 1 ) () ( 1 ) cB B B B S S S S
BS
−− + −− +
≥ .
















, this can be rewritten as
                                                                                                                                                
5 To show this, note that S/B = (S+1)/(B+1)  +  (S/B - (S+1)/(B+1)).() ( )
() ( )
33 2 2 2
23 2
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(2 ) ( ) ) 2 ) (2 ) ( )
(2 ) ( )
c z cf c f z cf c f z cf f
cz c f c fc cc f z fc fc c f c f c f z
fc f c f
−+ + ++ + − + ≥
+− + − − − + − + + − − −
−−
Subtracting the right-hand side from the left yields the quadratic equation
22 2 2 4( 5 4 2 ) 2 4 0 cz c c cf f z f c cf c −+ − +− +− −+ ≥ .
Rearranging terms gives
(a") []
222 4( 5) 2 ( 2 2 ) 0 cz c c z c c f f cz z c  −+ −− + + + − −≥  .







1 z = . It is positive between these roots. Because 
13








1/2 z < , the term in the second set of square brackets is negative. Hence, the full
expression must either have two roots in the interval [(1 )/4,1] c − or no roots at all. The
fact that (B1) is satisfied at  11 ( , ) ( /2, /2 1/2) BS B S =+  (where (S1) holds with equality)
implies that the expression (a") is positive at  1/2 z = . Hence, there is a unique solution
with  1 1/2 B <  and it satisfies
1 11 1












+  >− 

.
When B goes to infinity, f converges to zero, and the smaller solution to (a")







+  =− 

.
QEDHere is an intuition for the role of the aggregate seller/buyer ratio 
S
B
γ =  in the
limiting value of  1 B . When both markets are large, the crowding effects are small, so the
seller/buyer ratios in each market must be about the same. We saw above that with equal
seller/buyer ratios buyers are actually better off in the smaller market, while the seller's












. To have a quasi-
equilibrium, the efficiency advantage must be offset by the market impact that a seller
moving to the larger market would have. The market impact is  2 1/( 1) B + . When γ  is
larger, the efficiency advantage is reduced, while the market impact is unchanged. Hence,










C. One-sided Market Impact
One feature of the model that some may find unintuitive is that buyers and sellers
consider their market impact even when they are very small relative to the total market
size. For example on eBay, where most buyers are casual consumers and most sellers are
small and not-so-small businesses, it might be more plausible that sellers would consider
the market impact effect than that buyers would.
6  Possible reasons for this would be that
the market impact of a typical buyer is so small that the buyer might round it off to zero,
                                                
6 A recent New York Times article (Guernsey, 2000) reports that one-quarter of one percent of eBay’s
registered users are responsible for over two-thirds of the items listed. These sellers had an average of
seventy items each in the process of being auctioned at any point in time.or that buyers do not think about things enough or have enough experience to learn about
the effect.
In this subsection, we note that it is not necessary to assume that both buyers and
sellers recognize that they have a market impact to obtain our conclusions. It would
suffice for one side to do so. The proposition below establishes that there are still quasi-
equilibria with substantially different market sizes if we add the restriction that sellers
must be exactly indifferent between the two markets (as one would want to if only buyers
recognized the market impact effect.) The minimum possible fraction of agents in the










−  by this change. We have
chosen to add a seller indifference condition rather than a buyer indifference condition
only because the algebra is simpler that way. Which side of the market recognizes that
there is a market impact is not important.
Proposition 9
For fixed total numbers of buyers and sellers B and S with  2 BS >+, for every partition






∈− + , there is a quasi-equilibrium
1212 (, ,, ) SSBBwith  11 22 (,) (, ) ss uSB uSB = .
Proof: See appendix.
D. Integer-valued Equilibrium
So far we have been ignoring the constraint that the numbers of buyers and sellers
in each marker should be an integer. With a small number of traders it may be that only afew ratios of markets sizes are possible.  However, one would expect these integer
problems to become less important in large markets, and the next result shows that the
any ratio of market sizes in the interval given in Proposition 9 can be approximated by an
integer-valued equilibrium when the number of traders is sufficiently large.  Since given
“target ratios” of  1 B  to B and B to S can only be approximated by integers, the statement
of the result uses α  as the “target level” of 
1 B
B
 and γ  as the “target level” of   / SB .
Proposition 10





α  ∈− + 

 and any  0 ε >  there
exists B  such that for all B B >  there is an equilibrium  1212 (, ,, ) SSBB with  12 B BB += ,
1 / BBαε −< , and  / SBγ ε −<.
Proof:  See Appendix. The proof first constructs a quasi-equilibrium with equal prices
that approximates the target ratios, but where only  1 B  and  2 B  are guaranteed to be
integers; we then use this partition to construct an integer-valued partition where all of
the incentive constraints are satisfied but prices are only approximately equal.
Proposition 10 proves that when the number of buyers is large there exist equilibria
throughout the range of market sizes for which Proposition 9 shows that quasi-equilibria
with equal seller utility exist. We present this result rather than trying to show that
equilibria exist throughout the full range of market sizes for which Proposition 8 showsthat quasi-equilibria exist because accounting for the integer constraints is cumbersome,
and the algebra characterizing the equal-seller-utility equilibria is much simpler.
5. Exponentially Distributed Values
To test the robustness of our results we now consider another tractable
distribution, the exponential with ( ) exp( ) for  0 fv v v =− ≥ .  As we remarked earlier, the
exponential has an unbounded support, which might be appropriate for thinking about
rare art objects.
Because of this unbounded support, we would expect that adding more buyers has
a greater effect on the size of the highest order statistic, and this is indeed the case.  Here
the mean of the r








=∑ , so the expected price in a market
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The buyer’s expected utility is
()
:1 : 1 1 1 1
11 1 1 1 1
111 1
SS B B S S S i
kB S B
k k ik iS k ik i k
S
Ei i i i
B BB B B
µµ
+− − − −
== = = + = = = =

− = − === 
 ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑ ∑∑ .
The buyer’s utility function naturally extends to the positive reals by setting
(,) / b uS B SB =  if B S >  and  ( , ) 1 b uS B= if B S ≤ . The seller’s utility function can be
extended to noninteger values of B and S by setting  ( , ) 0 s uS B=  for B S ≤  and
(,) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) s uS B B S =Ψ + −Ψ + for B S > , where  () x Ψ  is the digamma function. The










Ψ= − + ∑ when x is an integer, where  0.577 η ≈  is Euler’s constant.
7 The












Ψ+= + − ∑ . When B and S are large this gives the approximation
11 1




uS B o S o B
SS B
   ≈− − +−   
  
.
8 Note that the seller’s utility increases
without bound as B increases for a given S.
The  b u  and  s u functions clearly satisfy (A1). (A2) is also satisfied , as  b u has the
desired monotonicity properties,  and  s u does because the digamma function is monotone
increasing.
9  The fact that larger markets are more efficient implies that (A3) is satisfied
on the integers. If the seller-buyer ratio is lower in the smaller market, then buyers will
prefer the larger market. If the two markets have the same seller-buyer ratio, then buyers
are indifferent, and efficiency (Proposition 2) implies that the sellers prefer the larger
                                                
7 The standard definition of the digamma function is  () () / () xx x ′ Ψ= Γ Γ where 
1
0 ()
xt xt e d t
∞ −− Γ= ∫ is the
gamma function.
8 The coefficient 
2k C  is the 2k
th Bernoulli number divided by 2k. The first two values for these coefficients
are 
2 1/12 C =− and 
4 1/120 C = .  As a result, the approximation is quite accurate even for relatively small
values of B and S. For example, the error is approximating  ( , )
s uS Bis less than 0.01 for any B if S is at
least 3.

























+ ∑ , which is clearly positive.one.  By monotonicity, sellers also prefer the larger market if the seller-buyer ratio is
higher in the small market. We believe that (A3) is satisfied for all noninteger B and S as
well, but have only been able to show that it holds for sufficiently large B (which is all
that is required for the proposition we give below.) To see this, note that differentiating
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This will be positive for all B greater than some cutoff B .
For (A4), the market impact effect of adding a buyer to market 2 is
2














 fixed, buyers are exactly indifferent between a smaller and a larger market. When
1 / B Bx > , the seller efficiency effect is bounded by
21
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22 11 2 1
1 11
1






uB BuB B B B





−≤ Ψ + − Ψ + = ≤ ≤
++ ∑
When B is large enough so that (A3) is satisfied, Proposition 5 implies that we can
find the range of values of  1 B for which a quasi-equilibrium exists by finding the
intersection of the curves where (B1) and (S1) are exactly satisfied. In our calculations
we use the approximation to the expected price given above, and thereby find
approximate bounds on the quasi-equilibrium set for large B.
                                                
10 The digamma function always satisfies  ( 1) ( ) 1/ z zz Ψ+− Ψ = , so this expression is exact even for
nonintegral values of B and S.Proposition 11
For any  0 ε > there exists a B  such that for all B B > the model with B buyers,  B γ









−+  ∈+ −  
, then there exists an  1 S for which

















>+  then there is no 1 S for which
11 1 1 (, ,, ) SB S B B B γ −−  is a quasi-equilibrium.
Remark: As with the uniform case, we can get intuition for the role of 
S
B
γ =  in the range
of equilibrium market sizes by comparing the seller’s market impact and efficiency
effects. (Buyers are indifferent between the two markets when the buyer-seller ratios are
equal.) The price impact of adding a seller is proportional to 2 1/( 1) S + . Using the
approximation ( , ) ln(1/ ) (1/ 1/ )/2 b uB B B B γγ λ ≈+ −, the efficiency advantage of the
large market is approximately
21
22 11
22 22 1 2
11 1 11 1 1









  − −
−≈ − − + − =  
 
When γ  is larger, the efficiency advantage is smaller for fixed  1 B  and  2 B , and thus
21 B B − can be increased without violating the constraint that the efficiency effect must be
smaller than the market impact.Remark: Proposition 11 says that when B is large quasi-equilibrium requires that the
fraction of buyers in the small market be at least about (1 ) / 4 γ − . The number of buyers
need not be very large for the “about” in this statement to be practically unimportant. For
example, we’ve examined this numerically and found that when  0.2 γ =  conclusions (a)
and (b) of the proposition will be true for 0.01 ε =  if B is at least eleven. For  0.8 γ = , they
will be true for 0.01 ε =  if B is at least eighteen.
Proof:  It suffices to show that for B sufficiently large, all intersections of the 
1
1
B S  and
1
1
S S curves with  1 /2 B B <  have  1 / B B  within ε of (1 ) / 4 γ − . (B1) holds with equality if

















The set of  1 B with 
11
11 11 () ()
BS SB SB =  is thus the set of solutions to
11




uB B u BB B B
B B
γγ γ −− + − =
++
Suppose that the LHS of this equation can be approximated by a function  1 (/ ) f BB in the
sense that








 −+ − + − =  ++ 
for all  (0,1/2] z∈ . If { } 1() B B is a sequence of solutions to 
11
11 11 (( ) ) (( ) )
BS SB B SB B =  for
B=1, 2, … and  z  is a subsequential limit point of  1() / B BB  then  () 0 . fz= Hence, it
suffices to show that for some choice of the approximating function  f the unique
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      ++  −= − = + +         ++ +       
 Plugging in
zB for  1 B , (1 ) z B −  for  2 B , 
2 /( 1) zB B γ +  for  1 S , etc. and approximating to first order, e.g.
1 (1/ ) 1/ B Bz = , 
2
1 (1/ ) ( 1) /( ) 1/ (1) B SB B z B z o γγ =+ = +, etc. gives
()
22 1 1 11
2(( , ) ( , ) ) 1 .
1 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ss
zB zB
Bu Bz B u B BB z B o
BB z z z z z z
γγ γ
γγ γ
−− − =+ − + + −+
++ − − − −
Setting  () f z equal to the function on the RHS of this expression and multiplying through
by  (1 ) z z γ −  we find  () 0 fz=  if and only if
22 ( 1 ) ( 1 ) 0 , zz z zzz γγ γ +− −+ −+ −=
which reduces to  (1 ) / 4. z γ =−
QED
6  Thin Markets
We have seen that a substantial range of market sizes is possible in both the
uniform and exponential cases.   We now test the robustness of that conclusion to the
possibility that markets are “thin,” in the sense of there being very few items available for
trade. Specifically, we suppose that each seller only has the good with a probability q<1,
and investigate the effect of varying q.   We suppose that buyers and sellers choosemarkets before either the buyer’s uncertainty or the seller’s is resolved; we think of q  as
the probability that the seller has a good of the appropriate type to sell in the “current
period.”  Thus when S is the number of potential sellers who enter a market, the number
of actual units for sale is a random variable S   that is distributed binomial (q, S).
 The exponential model is more tractable when this sort of uncertainty is
considered, so this is the only case we analyze here. As noted above, the expected utility
of a buyer in a market with B buyers and S units for sale is simply 
S
B
. Thus when supply
is random, if we let S    be the random number of units that are available for sale, we have








.   Since sellers only care about the price in the
event that they have a unit of the good to sell, their  expected utility conditional on having













. If  0 qS → , the probability that any other seller has a unit for sale
also goes to 0, and so all sellers prefer to be in the market with more buyers. More





> .  This is intuitive: when q is very small, each seller expects to be a monopolist,
and so prefers to be in the larger market; even if it has more sellers.
However, when  0 qS →  there are vanishingly few  objects offered for sale, so
this is a fairly extreme version of a thin market.  We next we consider a somewhat less
extreme version, with exactly three sellers, each of whom has an object to sell (so we go
back to  1 q = .)  Here there can be two active markets even when the number of buyers isvery large.   To see this in the exponential case, let  1 1 S = ,  2 2 S = ,  1 /3 B B =  and
2 2/ 3 B B = . Then buyers receive exactly the same utility in both markets and strictly
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γ  +− 

.
So the sellers in the large market get a higher utility by approximately ln2 1/2 0 −> .
Despite this difference in utility, the partition is still an equilibrium: because of the
“crowding effect,” the seller in the small market does not wish to move to the large one.






γ  +− 

, which is less than her current utility because
ln2 .693 5/6 ≈<.















=−  is an equilibrium of the model with uniformly distributed buyer values
for any B.
7. Related WorkThere are several sets of papers that develop other sorts of models of multiple
markets.  One set is on consumers having a preference for shopping at markets with a
more diverse range of products, as in Gehrig [1998]. In this model, firms choose between
locations; all firms at given location are equally spaced on a circle that represents product
characteristics, as in Salop [1979], and in equilibrium all firms at a given location charge
the same prices.  Consumers are located on the line a la Hotelling and pay a
transportation cost to visit the markets, which are located at the endpoints.  Additionally,
as in Stahl [1982] and Wolinsky [1983], consumers prefer larger markets because they
have a finer grid of available “varieties;” in Gehrig’s model the externality arises because
a finer grid of varieties reduces the expected distance between the closest available good
and the consumer’s preferred type.  Our model abstracts away both the preference for
more varieties at a site and the exogenous difference in market “locations.”
A second set of papers is the finance literature on competing exchanges, whose
starting point is the relationship between the volume of trade and the elasticity of
demand, which is interpreted as “asset liquidity.”
11 Pagano [1989] explores the
implications of this relationship in a model of competing asset markets, where agents
have identical CARA preferences, and are driven to trade because they have differing
endowments of a risky asset. As in Kyle [1989], Pagano assumes that players submit
demand functions as opposed to making simple bids, with the market outcome
determined by an implicit “auctioneer.”  He finds that if transaction costs in the two
markets are the same, the two markets can co-exist only if they are identical, but that the
                                                
11 See Kyle [1985, 89] and Admati and Pfleiderer [1988].two markets can co-exist if the choice of market influences the variance of endowment
and if transaction costs differ across markets.
12 
13
Then there is a literature on competing auctions in “large” markets, for example
McAfee [1993] and Peters and Severinov [1997].  In these papers, as in our model, all
goods are identical, and all agents are risk-neutral.  However, these models assume that
each market has a single seller, and they study only equilibria where each market has the
same size. 
14
We should also mention the literature on the asymptotic efficiency of double
auctions and other exchange mechanisms, e.g. Gresik and Satterthwaite [1989] and
Satterthwaite and Williams [1989].  These papers study trade in settings of two-sided
incomplete information, where we know from the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem that no
(incentive-compatible) mechanism can be ex-post efficient, and derive bounds on the rate
at which the ex-post inefficiency disappears as the economy grows.  Our welfare results
concern a different sort of inefficiency: trade in a given market is always ex-post efficient
in that market, but as Proposition 2 shows, ex-ante welfare is increasing in market size.
8.  Ideas for Future work
We would like to develop a model that incorporates adverse selection in the
market-participation decision.  Our casual empiricism suggests that a major reason that
                                                
12 Pagano calls the  identical-market outcome for zero transaction costs a knife-edge because all traders
would prefer market A if they expect it to be even slightly larger. However, the analysis throughout ignores
terms of order 1
2 / N , which may matter for the existence and/or robustness of the two-market equilibria.
13 Cuny [1993] develops a related model in which each market trades a single, possibly different, security.
14 In  Peters and Severinov, each seller runs a separate second-price auction with a reserve price; buyers
observe the reserve prices and then choose a single auction in which to bid. The paper looks at symmetric
equilibria in which all sellers attract an equal number of buyers.  McAfee analyzes a related model thatthe Amazon and Yahoo auction sites have struggled is that they tried to compete by
having zero listing fees.  This led to their listings being filled up with products being
offered by non-serious sellers with very high reserve prices.  If we suppose that there is a
cost to reading web pages, or to investigating the quality of a good and/or its seller, then
buyers will prefer to frequent sites with a high percentage of “good” listings- listings by
reputable sellers who have high-quality goods and are willing to sell them at a reasonable
price.  In this case, a market with too many “bad” sellers might collapse.  However, two
markets might be able to co-exist if sites have some background flow of captive traffic
from people who click in from Yahoo or Amazon without considering another auction
site.
The issue of reserve prices poses a problem for a would-be new market site: On
the one hand, when the market is new, sellers may not expect to get competitive bids, and
so be unwilling to participate unless they can protect themselves with a reserve price.
However, while the imposition of a uniform reserve price in a market can increase the
payoff of sellers for any fixed buyer-seller ratio, it lowers the overall efficiency of the
market, and so we would expect it to reduce the viability of the new market.
The main point of the paper is that  the “market impact  effect” of switching
markets is of the same order as the “efficiency effect” favoring  larger markets, so that
some  analysis is needed to determine which effect dominates.  We explored this idea in
the context of k+1
st price sealed-bid auctions, but the same intuition should apply to other
settings as well. Consider for example  “matching markets,” where the sole objective of
both A’s and B’s is to be matched with an agent from the other group. Here too once can
                                                                                                                                                
supposes players ignore the fact that a change in one seller’s mechanism may change the distribution ofshow that larger markets are more efficient, but an A moving from market 1 to market 2
lowers the probability of A’s being matched in market 2.  Moreover, while we have not
done the computations necessary to verify this, we suspect that both effects are again of
order 1/n. So here too it seems premature  to conclude that only the one market outcome
is stable. Another example is Krugman’s [1991] “Marshallian” model of location choice
by firms and workers.  This model differs from ours in that each firm hire multiple
workers, but it is similar in that the larger market is more efficient, and that there is a
market impact effect (which Krugman ignores) in finite markets.
Finally we should note that while the paper has analyzed competition between
two markets, its analysis also applies to the study of 2M markets, M “smaller” and M
“larger:”  Such a configuration will be an equilibrium provided that it is an equilibrium
for M= 1. One reason why such configurations may be less common in practice is that
our model suggests they could be quite fragile –if two or more of the markets merge, the
merged entity may be sufficiently large relative to the others so as to attract all of the
patrons of every small market. This shows that any tendency to have only two markets, as
opposed to more, must be due either to “relatively small” numbers of participants, or to
agglomerative forces not captured by our model.
                                                                                                                                                
buyers participating in other mechanisms, and thus alter buyers’ incentives to participate in them.Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: One way to generate a sample 
M Y  of mB draws from F  is to first
generate a sample 
N Y of nB i.i.d. draws, and then randomly select a subset of mB
elements; we will use this method to relate the distributions of the order statistics of the
two samples.    Let  i q  be the probability that the ith highest draw from 
N Y  is one of the
mS  highest elements of 
M S .  This probability is independent of the realized values of the
order statistics; it depends only on which elements of 
N Y  are chosen. In particular, for
1 i =  to mS,  i q  is simply the probability that the element in question is chosen, namely
m
n
; for i = mS+1 and thereafter each subsequent  i q  is strictly less than the preceding one
since this im Sj =+  will only be one of the mS highest elements if it is chosen and at
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where  i Q  is an indicator function that equals 1 for i =  1 to nS and 0 otherwise.
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QED
Proof of lemma 1: 
1
11 ()
B SB  is well-defined because  11 1 1 (,) ( , 1 ) BB uSB uSSBB −−− + is
continuous and monotone increasing in  1 S with
11 1 ( 0 , ) (, 1 ) (, 1 ) 0 BB B u B uS BB uS BB −− + = −− + <
and  11 1 (, ) ( 0 , 1 ) (, ) 0 BB B uS B u BB uS B −− + = > .
Let 
min B  be the solution to 
min min (0, ) ( 1, ) SS uB u SB B =+ −. That an unique
solution exists and is in (0, /2) B  follows from monotonicity and the boundary conditions
1
11 0 lim (0, ) ( 1, ) ( 1, ) 0 SS S B u B uS BB uS B
→ −+ − = −+<  and  (0, /2) ( 1, /2) 0 SS uB u SB −+ > .
Let 
max B  be the solution to 
max max (, ) ( 1 , ) SS uS B u BB =− . That an unique solution exists
and is in (/ 2 , 1 ) B follows similarly.1
1
S S  is well-defined on 
min max [, ] BB because  11 1 1 (,) ( 1 , ) SS uSB uSS BB −− + −  is
continuous and monotone decreasing in  1 S  with
min min
11 ( 0 , ) (1 , ) ( 0 , ) (1 , ) 0 , SS S S uB u SB BuB u SB B −+ − ≥ −+ − =
and 
max max




B S and 
1
1
S S  are monotone increasing and differentiable follows immediately
from the implicit function theorem.
1
11 () / 2
B SB S < follows from  ( /2, /2) ( /2, /2 1) 0 BB uS B uS BB −− + > .
1
11 () / 21 / 2





Proof of Proposition 9: When prices are equal, both seller constraints are satisfied. Equal











 is the same in both markets, so




















Rewrite (a’) and (b’) as
(2 ) ij j i SB S B +≥ .
Add and subtract terms to obtain
(1 ) ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ij i j SB S B ++ + − + ≤ (1 ) (1 ) ( 1 ) jj j j SB S B ++ − + +Divide both sides by (1 ) (1 ) ij BB ++
(*)
1( ) 1
11 ( 1 ) ( 1 )
jj i j i i
ij i j
SB S S B S
BB B B
+− + + +
≥−
++ + +
Using the fact that prices are equal, (*) is equivalent to
(**) jiji B SSB ≤++,














For any  12 , B B  that satisfy (***), the buyer constraints are satisfied for the  1 S  and
2 S  that equate the expected prices in the two markets. The last step of the proof is to
show that under (***) there must exist a pair  12 , SS  that does equate the expected prices.
Holding  12 , B B  fixed, and setting  21 SS S =−, the difference in expected prices is
112 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2
11 22
12 12
( )( 1) ( ( ))( 1) ( 1)( ) ( 1) ( )
(,) (, )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
B SB B SS B B SS B S BB
pS B pS B
BB BB
− + −− − + + −−++−
−= =
++ ++
which is a linearly decreasing function of  1 S .  When  1 0 S =   the difference is
proportional to  11 2 (1 ) ( ) SB B B ++ − ; from (***) this is at least  1 0 SB > . Similarly when
1 SS =  the difference is proportional to  21 2 2 (1 ) ( ) 0 SB B B S B −+ + − < − < .  So there is a
solution with  12 0, SS S << .
QED
Proof of Proposition 10: We will first construct an equal-price partition  121 2 ˆˆ (, , , )
jj B BSS
that approximates the target ratios, but where only  1 B  and  2 B  are guaranteed to beintegers; we will then use this partition to construct an integer-valued partition
**
1212 (,,,) B BSS where all of the incentive constraints are satisfied but prices are only
approximately equal.
















+   =
+
, where  x    is
the largest integer less than or equal to x, and   x      is the smallest integer greater than or
equal to x.
15  Note that  
* γγ ≤  ,and 
* 12 12 αα −≥ − ;  since we have already assumed that
12 γ α >− , we know that 







.   Note also that for B
sufficiently large we have 
* 1/2 α < .
 Let 
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.   Define 
*
1 (2 ) 1 BB α =+ − ,
















** * 12 αα ν ≥− = ,  set  ( 2) 2
jj SB γ =+ − ,  11 ˆ (1 ) 1
jj SB γ =+ − , and  22 ˆ (1 ) 1
jj SB γ =+ − .
If  
** 12 αα <− , define
(2 ) 2
jj SB γ =+ −   ,  11 ˆ (1 ) 1
jj SB γ =+ −   , and  22 ˆ (1 ) 1
jj SB γ =+ −   .
   In either case, by construction  12 , B B  and 











                                                
15 The case  1/2 α >  is symmetric. A separate argument is needed for  1/2 α = ; we omit this argument
here but will provide it on request. If 
** * 12 αα ν ≥− = ,
** *
** (2 ) 2 (2 ) 2 2 2 ( 1) 2 (( 1) )
[, ]
jj SB B j k
B BB B B B
γγ γ γ
γγ
+− +− − − −
==+ ∈ − + , which is




> . If  
** 12 αα <− ,  a similar calculation shows
**












Note also that 
11 1 * *
11 1 1 ˆˆ (1 )(1 ) ( ) ( 2 ) 2
jj j j jj SS B B B γγγ γ αα
++ + −= + − + = − += .
If    
** 12 αα <− ,
11 *
11 1 1 ˆˆ (1 )(1 )
jj j j SS B B γγ α
++ −= + − + =    .





α  ∈− + 

 and the bound on B  implies that,










.    Thus Proposition 4 implies that each partition  121 2 ˆˆ (, , , )
jj B BSS
satisfies all four incentive constraints.  And
If  1 ˆ j S  is an integer for any  {0,1,..., } jk ∈  we are done.  If not,   and if
** * 12 αα ν ≥− = , let m be the smallest integer j with  
1
11 ˆˆ jj SS
−   =   . We know that
*
11 ˆˆ2
mm SS α  −≥  , so 
**
11 ˆˆ 12
mm SS αν  −≤ − =   . If 
** 12 αα <− , let m be the largest j
integer with  
0
11 ˆˆ j SS  <  , then  
**
11 ˆˆ mm SS αν  −≤=  .   In either case let  
*
11 ˆm SS   =   and
**
21 SS S =− . We will now show that ()
**
12 12 ,,, B BSS  is an equilibrium; that is, the
deviation of the partition from exactly equal prices (which is necessary to satisfy the
integer constraint) is small enough that the  incentive constraints are still satisfied.Since we set the number of sellers in market 1 to be slightly higher than the
number needed for equal prices, the constraints (a) - that buyers are willing to stay in
market 1- and (d)- that sellers stay in market 2- will be the easiest to check.  For (a), note
that by Proposition 4,  12 12 ˆˆ (,, , )
mm B BS S  satisfies the constraint; the fact that 
*
11 ˆm SS >
implies it is satisfied by ()
**
12 12 ,,, B BSS .    For (d), note that note that since
12 12 ˆˆ (,, , )
mm B BS S  has equal prices, the fact that 
*
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 or, using the facts that prices are equal at
12 12 ˆˆ (,, , )












.  Since 
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−≤.    By construction 
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11 ˆm SSν −≤ , and
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i .  When we ignored the integer constraint, the term in the
brackets was equal to 1; the issue now is whether the integer partition keeps this term
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, where  x  and y  are defined as the two fractions insides of the












































** * * *
21 2 1 2 1 2
21 2 1 2 1 2
11 1 1 1
(1 )
1 1 1 ( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1)
SS S B S S B
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δδ
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.
We claim that the left hand side is   at  most  
*





 as shown by:
** * * *
* 21 22 1 1
2 1 2211 21
ˆˆ 111111 11
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 in the right-hand side of  (**)  is   less thanγ .
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.
Substituting the approximation  for δ  from (*) into the expression δγ ,  and using the
fact that  (1/ ) oB
B
δ






(/) ( 1 /)
(1 )( 2) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1)
SB BS
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−+ + + + +
.
The right hand side of this expression is
* *
12 12
12 12 12 12
1111
(/) ( 1 /)
( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1) ( 1)( 1)
SBBS
OB o B




++ ++ ++ ++
=11
(/) ( 1 /)







−+ + −+ +
.
Multiplying through by  (1 )B αα − and collecting terms,  we see that for the constraint is
satisfied if
* 21 2 ( / ) ( 1 / ) OB B B o B νγα ε ≤+ − + + .
Since 
* 12 ν α ≤−  and 
* νγ < , we conclude that for all sufficiently small ε  (the necessary
value depending on 
* γ ν − ) the incentive constraint is satisfied for all sufficiently large B.   
This is sufficient to complete the proof, since we can always choose to carry out the
above construction with  /' SBγ εε −<< if the exogenous ε    in the hypothesis of the
proof is too large for this last step to be valid.
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Figure 4